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AFTER THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT IN
PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES D. McHUGH*
The year of 1936 was a year of the gravest consequence in the lives of a
great multitude of Pennsylvania residents. In this year more* than 55,000 automobile accidents occurred within the borders of the Commonwealth. Almost
twenty five hundred of the hapless victims of these accidents went to their deaths;
more than fifty thousand others were injured.' Many of the injured were seriously
crippled or grotesquely disfigured, and rendered virtually without value in a practical world. The savings of numerous lifetimes were dissolved in the payment of
the bills of physicians, hospitals and undertakers. Automobiles, by the thousand,
were consigned to the junkheap. In scores of homes, pay checks were stopped
2
forever by death, or diminished by disability.
The legislature has, through two means, undertaken to meet this problem.
It has enacted amendments to the Vehicle Code further regulating the manner of
operating an automobile,8 and it has enacted amendments to the financial responsibility law further regulating the requirement of proof of financial responsibility.'
Our discussion here will be limited to the second means.
The financial responsibility law was enacted principally to ameliorate the
effects of automobile accidents. But it has also been an influence for safety, in
so far as it has taken some persons from the highways and has provided the threat
of the expense of insurance premiums for others who might come within its operation. However, it was chiefly to provide the balm of money damages. at least hi
some instances, that this law began its life in 1934. The statute is directed at
those persons, who, according to the standards established by the act are most
likely to cause damages or injuries to others.' From the members of this group
the act demands assurance of their ability to respond in damages before they will
be permitted to continue to use the highways.
*A.B. 1927, Georgetown University; LL.B. University of Pennsylvania, 1930. Counsel, Bureau
of Motor Vehicles, Department of Revenue.
IStatistical Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents. (See table on page 223)
2E. Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences, 3 Law and Contemporary
Problems 466 (1936).
2House Bill No. 1984, Printer's No. 1918.
4
Senate Bill No. 758, Printer's No. 538.
5N. P. Feinsinger, Financial Responsibility Laws and Compulsory Insurance: The Problem
in Wisconsin, 10 Wisconsin Law Review 192, (1934).
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In its essence, and previous to the 1937 session of the legislature, the financial
responsibility law provided,6 that a person shall not be allowed to continue to
operate an automobile on the highways of Pennsylvania without first establishing
proof of financial responsibility, (1) when his operator's license has been suspended, or (2) when within the twelve months preceding his application for
license, he has done damage to others in excess of $200 by the negligent operation
of his automobile, or (3) when he has failed to satisfy a judgment in excess of
$200 arising out of an automobile accident. Financial responsibility may be
established by filing with the Secretary a certificate of an insurance company, or the
bond of a corporate surety company, or by depositing with the Secretary $10,000
in cash. 7 Wherever financial responsibility is required it must be established in
the minimum amounts of $5,000/$10,000. 8 In almost every instance, where
proof of financial responsibility has been given, it has been established by means
of an insurance company certificate. 9 Therefore, for all practical purposes "financial responsibility" means a policy of insurance.
The argument most frequently advanced in support of this law is that it
applies only to the person who has demonstrated that he is not a careful driver
or who has shown by actual experience that he is without financial worth. However, assuming that all drivers may be classified in the records of the Department
of Revenue as careful or careless drivers, it would seem that the merits of this
law should be judged not merely on the basis of the capability or financial, worth
of some of the drivers that are excluded from its operation, but by the degree and
frequency that the law provides financial recompense to the victim of accidents
on the highway.
There are no statistics available, showing the payments made to claimants in
Pennsylvania automobile accidents, but the general testimony is to the effect that
comparatively few persons ever recover any money compensation unless the defendant is insured.1 0 We are told that this result is allowed to occur, for one
6The Act of May 15, 1933, No. 110, P.L. 553.
715Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly 33. In the draft of a proposed compulsory automobile financial responsibility act prepared by a special committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association no provision is made for the establishment of financial responsibilty by the depositing of
cash or a liability bond. Some members of the committee thought that such provisions might be
held to be a special law for the collection of debts and therefore contrary to Art. 3,,sec. 7, clause 17
of the State Constitution.
$Section I of the Act of May 15, 1933, P.L. 553, provides that financial responsibility shall
be established to cover the "personal injury to or death of any one person in the amount of at
least five thousand ($5,000) dollars, and, subject to such limit for any one person injured or
killed, in an amount of at least ten thousand ($10,000) dollars for injury to or the death of two
or more persons in any one accident, and for damage to property in the amount of at least one
thousand ($1,000) dollars, resulting from any one accident."
9In one instance only was the bond of a surety company used to establish proof of financial
responsibility. Records of Division of Safety, Department of Revenue.
10Shippen Lewis, Merits of Automobile Compensation Plan, 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 583 (1936).
Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents; A Symposium, 32
Columbia Law Review 785 (1932).
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reason, because of a wish not to impose upon the so-called "careful driver" the
obligation of purchasing insurance for which, presumptively, he will have no use.
The conclusion that "careful drivers" do not need insurance is predicated upon the
premise that "careful drivers" are never involved in accidents. It takes no cognizance of the every day reality that the so called "careless driver" exercises no discrimination in the choice of victims. 1 If the victim is a "careful driver" and the
"careless driver" carries no insurance the consequence is almost always a financial
loss to the "careful driver." The person whom the financial responsibility law
seeks to favor then is made to feel and pay for the lack of more universal automobile insurance. Consequently, in determining the value of the exemption granted
to the pocket book of the "careful driver" it should be borne in mind that the
freedom from the obligation of purchasing insurance involves the exposure of the
same pocket book to a far heavier toll in the form of property damages and personal injuries inflicted by an uninsured driver.
The other stronghold of the defenders of the financial responsibility law, i. e.,
the increase in the insurance rates under any other more stringent plan, has been
made to appear impregnable enough to check the most redoubtable legislator. 12
The principal exhibit used in this argument is the increase in automobile insurance
rates that has occurred under the Massachusetts compulsory insurance law. 13 But
in considering this argument, it must be remembered that an increase in rates has
been the general experience in this country in the last ten years. Although the
compulsory insurance law has increased the rates of automobile insurance in Massachusetts it has produced virtually universal automobile insurance in that state,
while the financial responsibility laws and the higher insurance rates effective in
the various other states having such a law, have produced only a very small increase
in the number of insured automobiles. 14 A careful study, recently completed by
a Connecticut Commission reached the conclusion that insurance rates under the
compulsory law of Massachusetts were generalry lower than the insurance rates
effective in Connecticut under a voluntary insurance law. As a result of the report
of this Commission a bill was recently presented in the Connecticut legislature
providing for compulsory automobile insurance. 15 However, as indicated above,
1lSupra, Note 1, see "No violation."
12Edward C. Stone, Critique of Massachusetts Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance,
Published by Association of Casualty and Surety Executives.
13Ralph H. Blanchard, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts. 3
Law and Contemporary Problems 537 (1936).
It is shown that premium rates have increased
approximately
50% over 1926.
4
1 Report of Special Committee on Automobile Accident Compensations, 24 Pennsylvania
Bar Association Quarterly 101 (1935).
15Report of the Governor's Temporary Commission to Study The Financial Responsibility
Act, State of Connecticut, December 1936. The Commission recommended that a State fund be
established and that from this fund the medical, surgical, hospital and nursing expenses be paid in
a sum not exceeding three hundred ($300) dollars for every resident of Connecticut injured by an
automobile in Connecticut. The payments from the fund should be made without delay and
without reference to the "fault" of the injured person. The motorist at fault should be re-

216

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

general conclusions relating to the relative cost of insurance under a compulsory
insurance law in one state and under a financial responsibility law in another are
based on uncertain grounds because of the lack of comparable statistics in this
field.
In plugging the gaps that the experience of three years exposed in the
financial responsibility law the legislature considered the objection that was made
against the underlying theory of the law and those objections that were made
against the manner of the operation of the law.
The argument that is made against the basic theory of the financial responsibility law is that it is founded upon the doctrine of "fault" and that the doctrine
of "fault" is no longer suitable for determining liability in automobile accidents,' 6
and therefore the financial responsibility law should be discarded. It is true that
the financial responsibility law derives its sustenance, in large measure, from the
doctrine of "fault." The reasonableness and strength of the doctrine of "fault" is
the reasonableness and strength of the financial responsibility law. Indeed, the
chief justification for requiring those persons whose negligence has caused injuries
or damages to others, or who have been unable to pay certain judgments, founded
on their negligent operation of an automobile, to prove their financial responsibility
and not to require such proof of all other drivers, is that negligence or "fault" can
be traced to such persons. 17 But it is argued that the development of the speed,
braking capacity and general ease of control of the automobile have engendered
problems in the placing of responsibility that make an automobile negligence trial
little more than a guessing game. The result of increasing the mobility of the automobile has been to push further back the boundaries of negligence and to add to the
difficulty of determining whether the conduct in question has crossed the boundary.
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the movements of an automobile contributing to or causing an accident will yield the truth of their occurrence only to the analysis of a scientist, or one especially skilled in such problems. But the legislature
has, by retaining and amending the present financial responsibility law accepted for
the present, at least, "fault" as the proper determinant of liability in automobile
accidents.
quired to compensate the fund for the amount paid out by it on behalf of the injured person.
House Bill No. 1781, Printer's No. 1731, introduced at the 1937 session of the legislature, would
allow hospitals to recover from the Commonwealth on account of expenses in the care of indigent
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents and provided that such expenses should be paid' from
the Motor License Fund. This bill is analogous to the recommendation of the Connecticut Commission in that every one injured in an automobile accident in the Commonwealth would be assured
of receiving prompt and proper medical attention. The bill (H.B. 1415-3-1 Motor Vehicles) that
was introduced in the Connecticut legislature did not closely follow the recommendations of the
Commission but provided for compulsory insurance with $5,000/$10,000 limits for death or
injury to any person or persons and $1,000 limit for damage to property, and was defeated.
1Justice Horace Stern, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Negligence as a Basis for Liability in
Automobile Accidents, 14 Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly 104 (1932). Report by the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents to the Columbia Council for Research
in the Social Sciences, (1932) pages 216 and 217.
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However, the legislature has recognized the validity of the principal objections that have been made against the manner of operation of the law, and, by
amendment, has attempted to meet them
It was said that the law did not include a sufficient number of persons to
achieve a practical result.' 8 The statute until it was amended by the legislature at
its last session provided that any person whose negligence had caused two or more
accidents aggregating more than $200 in the twelve months preceding his application for an operator's license shall be required to establish financial responsibility
before a license for the succeeding year shall be issued to him. 19 The terms of the
act have been made more extensive by requiring financial responsibility of every
person who wishes to obtain or retain an operator's license and who has caused one
or more accidents aggregating $100 or more in any twelve months period, unless
such person pays all the claims for damages that have resulted from his negligence.

The substitution of "any twelve month period" in place of "the twelve month
period next preceding" an application for an operator's license will remove the
delay that sometimes occurred before the law began to operate. Because this
amendment exempts from its operation persons who have paid damage claims
against them, arising out of an automobile accident, it will exclude some persons
from its scope who formerly would have been required to establish their financial
responsibility. However, it is believed, that this exemption will, on the whole,
have a beneficial result because it will foster the payment of claims and will provide an additional incentive for obtaining insurance. But this exemption from the
requirement of insurance does not mean that the Department will not continue
to have the authority to suspend an insured operator's license and to demand proof
of his financial responsibility under the act before reinstating his license where
such operator has committed any violation of the Vehicle Code.
7

1 Richard M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 Law
and Contemporary Problems 476 (1936). There is one instance where the suspension of operator's
license and the requirement of proof of financial responsibility is not dependent upon "fault." Section 615 b-4 of the Act of May 1st, 1929, P.L. 905 (The Vehicle Code) authorizes the Secretary of
Revenue to suspend the license of any person "operating any motor vehicle involved in an accident
resulting fatally to any person." In Commonwealth v. Wilson, C.C.P. No. 5, Dec. Term, 1936, No.
5712, Philadelphia County, where the license of a person, innocent of negligence, criminal or otherwise, was suspended on a showing that he was operating a motor vehicle involved in a fatil

accident, the action of the Secretary was sustained. Alessandroni, J., said: "There can be no mistake
as to the legislative intent when it empowered the Secretary of Revenue to suspend an operator's
license wherever it was shown that his automobile was involved in a fatal accident. It is urged
by the appellant that this provision is too drastic and operates unjustly, since it deprives one of
the right to operate a motor vehicle, who, through no carelessness or fault of his own, has
been involved in a fatal accident. This may be so, but without attempting to read the legislative
mind it is not too much to say that the mounting frequency of fatal accidents of this type has
made it necessary in the interests of public safety to fasten greater responsibility than heretofore
upon drivers."
IsReport of Special Committee on Automobile Accident Compensation, 24 Pennsylvania Bar
Association
Quarterly 101 (1935).
19Section 8, Act of May 15, 1933, P.L. 553.

218

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

The legislature has, in another act, brought within the jurisdiction of the
Public Utility Commission all common and contract carriers doing an intrastate
business and confers upon the Commission the authority to require insurance of
all such carriers. 20 The Public Service Commission formerly had the authority to
require insurance only of common carriers and it is estimated that this additional
authority will allow the Public Utility Commission to require insurance of thirty
thousand more carriers than formerly.
Further, the amount of the judgment remaining unpaid before insurance shall
be required, 2 1 has been reduced from $200 to $5.33. The amount of $5.33 was
chosen because the right of appeal from a verdict obtained in a magistrate's court
exists only where the judgment exceeds this amount, and it was deemed advisable
to require proof of financial responsibility only where the defendant had a right of
appeal. The figure was lowered from $200 because it was thought that the public
needed protection from a person unable to satisfy a judgment less than $200, at
least as much as it needed protection from a person unable to satisfy a judgment
in excess of $200.
It was also urged, in opposition to the operation of the law, that, in every
instance where the Department of Revenue suspended the operator's license of a
person, it was required, because of such suspension, to require proof of financial
responsibility before the license could be reinstated. The inevitable result of this
provision was that the Department, being unwilling to require proof of financial
responsibility for the less serious offenses, was deprived of the use of the suspension of the operator's license in minor infractions of the Vehicle Code, where a
suspension would have had a salutary effect. Such a suspension was a safety
measure exercised by the Department for years before the advent of the financial
responsibility law.22 However, the legislature has, by an amendment, given to
the Department the discretion to determine what persons among those suspended
shall be required to prove their financial responsibility. This amendment will
restore to the Department the authority to use the suspension of an operator's
license as a cautionary measure without necessarily imposing upon the person
whose license has been suspended the obligation of establishing his financial responsibility.
20House Bill No. 851. Printer's No. 832, Section 815. Lyman Brownfield, Compulsory LiaThe
bility Insurance for Commercial Vehicles, 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 571 (1936).
Interstate Commerce Commission is given the authority to require insurance of commercial vehicles
engaged in interstate commerce under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. 49 U.S. Stat. 543, 15 U. S.
C. A. 77c.
213 Fed. Sup. 697 (N.Y.). Judgment creditors were restrained from filing with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of New York a certified copy of an unsatisfied judgment against a
bankrupt on the grounds that to do otherwise would deny to the bankrupt the full effect of his discharge in bankruptcy. But see 6 Fed. Sup. 158 (N.Y.) where a contrary result was reached.
22Robbins B. Stoeckel, Administrative Problems of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 Law and
Contemporary Problems, 530 (1936).

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

The complaint was also made that the insurance coverage required under the
law, gave more extensive coverage than was required, and added needlessly to
the cost of such insurance.23 For example, if the operator of an automobile which
was covered by the insurance of the owner, against the negligence of the operator,
fell within the operation of the financial responsibility law, such operator would
be required to obtain a motor vehicle operator's policy. Because it frequently
occurred that such operator operated no other vehicle than the insured vehicle
of his employer, this additional insurance, as a practical matter, gave no greater
protection to the public. It was nothing but an expensive surplusage. An amendment to the law allows a person formerly obliged to be individually insured, to
operate a vehicle insured by the owner against the operator's negligence without
establishing his own financial responsibility. The amendment also provides that
such operator shall only be allowed to operate vehicles which are insured and
which are described by appropriate reference on his operator's card.
Another objection made against the operation of the law was that it required
the suspension of the license of an operator or the registration plates of an owner
when a judgment against either or both of them remained unpaid. The purpose
of this provision is to force the payment of judgments, but its effect was frequently
to prevent the payment of them by depriving the debtor of the use of his vehicle
which might be the only means he had of earning the money to discharge the debt.
By amendment, it is provided that no licenses shall be suspended because of an
unsatisfied judgment where the court has by its decree allowed such judgment to
24
be paid in installments and there is no default in the payment of the installments.
But notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has stood its ground and
strengthened the weaknesses existing in the financial responsibility law, there is
an unmistakable trend toward the establishment of a broader base of liability and
the providing of a surer means of compensation in automobile accidents. 2 The
Vehicle Code, has, in two instances, abrogated the common law rules of liability
and imposed vicarious liability upon the owner of an automobile jointly and severally with its operator. The Code stipulates that an owner of an automobile, who
2

3Report of Special Committee on Uniform Automobile Liability Security Act, 20 Pennsylvania

Bar Association Quarterly 103 (1934). Report of the Special Commission to Study Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance and Related Matters, Massachusetts Senate No. 280 (1930),
page 2175.
4
Joseph H. Graun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 Law and Contemporary Problems
505 (1936).
Schedule of provisions of laws in effect in other states.
25
Francis Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in
Europe, 79 U. of P. Law Rev. 271. In France it appears to be finally settled that the operator of a
vehicle is liable for all damage done unless he can show that the damage was caused by an unforseen event or the contributory negligence of the other party. In Germany, liability is imposed upon
the lawful possessor of a vehicle regardless of fault, unless the accident was inevitable or was caused
by the exclusive negligence of the other person. In Finland, liability is imposed upon the owner
for damages caused by his vehicle, regardless of the fault of the operator. However, where the
plaintiff has been contributorily negligent, the court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount of
compensation. In Norway the law in this particular matter is similar to the law in Finland.

DICKINSON LAW

220

REVIEW

knowingly allows a person under sixteen years of age to operate his vehicle, shall
be jointly and severally liable for any damages caused by the negligence of such
minor. 26 In this instance it is no longer required to prove agency to hold the owner
responsible. The common law immunity from liability for the torts of their servants in the performance of municipal functions, long enjoyed by municipal corporations, has also yielded to the social urgency of compensation for the accident
victim. 27 The Vehicle Code provides that municipalities shall be jointly and sev-

erally liable for any damages caused by an employe in the negligent operation of
an automobile in the course of his employment. The legislature, at its recent session, further amended the Vehicle Code to overcome a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which held that municipalities are not liable for the negli28
gence of their servants in the operation of fire engines.
The current problem of liability in automobile accidents is closely analogous
to the problem existing immediately before the widespread enactment of Workmen's Compensation Laws in this country. It was the enormous increase in the
accidents occurring in the factories of the country during the early days of this
century and the appalling consequences to the victim and his dependents that
first gave notice to the various legislatures of the need of remedial legislation iai
this field. Also it had become apparent that the defenses used by the employer
to escape liability, such as the defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine frequently worked great injustices to the persons injured. Further, it was realized that many of the accidents
were unavoidable and could not be blamed upon the carelessness of any person.
It was thought that the money loss arising from such accidents should be placed
upon the group causing the condition producing the accident and not upon the
victim, who was, on many occasions, merely the victim of the condition. Today, as
in the earlier days of the century, the attention of the various legislatures has been
attracted by a heavy accident toll and its consequent misery. The established processes of the law for the obtaining of compensation have been seriously questioned.
Also there is evidence that many of the accidents occurring are unavoidable. In
many cases great hardship has resulted to the victim. These symptoms, found in
the mischief of the automobile accident are closely similar to the symptoms of the
29
situation presented by the industrial accident of a generation ago.
One of the objectionable features of the financial responsibility law has been
that its effect was to prohibit absolutely the use of highways to thousands of
26

Section 618, Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905.
Section 619, Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905.
91n Devers v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13 (1932) a municipality was held not liable for the negligent operation of its fire engine by an employe because section 619 only imposes liability on municipalities for the negligent operation of their "vehicles" and a fire engine is not a "vehicle" under
the definition contained in the Vehicle Code. Also see Mooney v. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. Super. 433
(1934) where a municipality was held liable for the negligence of the operator of one of its garbage
27
2

trucks.
29Harper on Torts, 1933 edition, Chap. 11, page 412.
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residents who are reasonably capable drivers but who have not established their
financial responsibility. In the three completed years since the financial responsibility law began its operation, the licenses of 30,291 persons have been either suspended or revoked. 30 Of this number only 6,785 have established proof of their
financial responsibility and have regained their licenses.3 1 It is believed that most
of these persons have failed to establish their financial responsibility because of
the high cost of such insurance. 32 There are two possible explanations for the
high premiums charged for insurance under the act. The first is that the persons
purchasing such insurance are actually a more hazardous risk than other persons.
The second is that the insurance companies, not having sufficient actual experience in the capability of such persons, have been guided solely by the idea which
underlies financial responsibility law, i.e., that only careless drivers are required
to obtain such insurance. 33
The interest and thought that the problem of the uncompensated automobile
accident has engendered is manifest in the number and variety of bills that were
introduced in the 1937 session of the legislature relating to automobile insurance.
Such legislative activity is ample proof that the various communities throughout
are aware of the inadequacies in the law that time has revealed
the Commonwealth
to exist. 34 It is probable that the last word has not yet been said in the question
3OReasons for withdrawal. (See table on page 224)
3
1In 1934 there were 1321 reinstatements; in 1935 there were 2674 reinstatements; in 1936
there were 2790 reinstatements. Out of a total of 3995 persons establishing proof of financial responsibility in 1934-35, there were 1428 who formerly carried insurance, 1634 who formerly did not
carry insurance, and 933 who did not state whether they formerly were covered by insurance.
Division
of Safety, Department of Revenue.
82There is a 50% surcharge where the insurance is required because of a suspension of license
where the offense was (1) operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, or (2) failing to stop
and render assistance when involved in an accident, or (3) homicide or assault arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle.
There is a 25% surcharge where the insurance is required because of a 'suspension of license
where the offense was, (1) driving a motor vehicle at an excessive rate of speed or in a reckless
manner and where an injury to person or damage to property actually results therefrom.
There is a 10% surcharge where the insurance is required because of a suspension of license
for any other cause. Manual of Automobile Insurance, Pennsylvania Rates, National Bureau of
Casualty and Surety Underwriters, page 83.
SSlt is the policy of the Department to refusa to issue an operator's license to any person,
regardless of his ability to establish proof of financial responsibility, who will be a menace on the
highways. For policy in Massachusetts and statistics, see supra, note 13, page 552.
S4House Bill No. 331, Printer's No. 328 would require every vehicle, except those owned by
the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, to be insured and would allow the rates of premiums to be established by rating bureaus conducted by the insurance companies and would authorize
the Insurance Commissioner to file objections to the rates in the Dauphin County Court.
House Bill No. 1643, Printer's No. 1587 is identical with House Bill No. 331, but in addition
thereto makes reference to a State Automobile Compensation Fund which shall have the authority
to issue policies of automobile insurance.
House Bill No. 543, Printer's No. 438 would require the Department of Property and Supplies
to procure liability insurance covering vehicles owned by the Commonwealth and the federal government when operated by members of the National Guard, which insurance would insure not only
the Commonwealth but also the person operating the vicide.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

of automobile insurance.3 5 The legislature has prepared the way for further legislation by making provision that it will have complete information relating to the
problem at its next session. An amendment to the financial responsibility act requires insurance companies to notify the Department of the number of vehicles
that are insured under the Financial Responsibility Act and the number of ap36
plicants for such insurance whose applications have been refused.
A joint resolution authorizes the Insurance Department and the Department
of Revenue to make an investigation of the efficacy and wisdom of the automobile insurance laws in effect in Pennsylvania and in other states and directs them
to make a report of their findings and recommendations to the next session of the
37
legislature.
Harrisburg, Pa.

James D. McHugh.

House Bill No. 1243, Printer's No. 1202 would prohibit an insurance company from discriminating against or refusing to insure any physically handicapped person who has obtained an operator's license in this Commonwealth.
House Bill No. 1645, Printer's No. 1589 is a joint resolution proposing an amendment to
article 3, section 21 of the state constitution. The amendment proposed would allow the enactment
of laws providing for compensation in a limited amount, to be awarded by a board regardless of
fault, for injuries and property damage arising out of automobile accidents. Doubtlessly, this bill
was prepared because of the amendment to this section of the state constitution giving the General
Assembly the authority to prescribe maximum and minimum payments under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is submitted that a constitutional amendment is not required before an automobile compensation law could be effective. If the remedy under the automobile compensation act
were made optional with the person injured tho constitutional objection that the person injured
was deprived of a jury trial would be removed. On this basis an award under the Workmen's
Compensation Act was sustained before the amendment was made to the state constitution. Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33 (1916). Also the applicant for an operator's license might
be required to consent to be bound by the compensation act as to any injuries sustained by him
while operating an automobile in the state. For a discussion of this question, see! Wayland H.
Elsbree and Harold Cooper Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Accidents, 76
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 690 (1928)
House Bill No. 1469, Printer's No. 1416 would require every person engaged in the business
of renting automobiles without the services of an operator to insure such automobiles and would
impose liability upon the owner for damages caused by the negligence of the operator.
Senate Bill No. 754, Printer's No. 534 would establish a rating bureau for the classification
of risks and the fixing of premium rates for automobile insurance.
85R. Leighton Foster, K. C., Automobile Liability Security Laws of the United States and
Canada, page 20. Address delivered before the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners,
Seattle,6 Washington, July 10, 1935.
837 Section 26.
House Bill No. 1645, Printer's No. 1589.
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department
of Revenue.
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REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL

1924
to

1930

1981

1982

1988

1984

1985

1986

Total

7570

102

1908

1898

1538

2338

2888

2832

20564

490
7

258
1662

201
24

216
48

181
88

288
86

289

840

2178

94

76

2030

14

29

84

38

89

88

52

68

807

1726
84

905

751

614

620

676

648

626

6566

28

10
7

11
9

12
19

11
24

21
20

25
92

27
25

151
164

1

1

1930
REVOCATIONS
Intoxication -----------------------Failure to Stop (Accident) --------Convicted of Felony ----------------Operating During Period of Revocation
Larceny --------------------------Permitting Violation --------------Misstatement of Facts -----------Turning Off Lights to Avoid Arrest ....
Manslaughter --------------------Operating Without Comsent of Owner -Assault & Battery (Auto) ----------

249
19

Reckless Driving -----------------Violation of Liquor Laws -----------

17
868

Miscellaneous ---------------------TOTAL -----------------------

2

-16

16
249
19
8

-89

1

8

8

17
877

2

1

2

8

54

10577

2977

2989

2849

2448

8407

8500

4002

82694

Intoxication ----------------------2202
Failure to Stop (Accident) ----------97
Reckless Driving -----------------1745
Manslaughter ---------------------164
Misstatement of Facts -------------186
Turning Off Lights to Avoid Arrest -4
Larceny
-------------------------718
Assault & Battery (Auto) ----------205
Operating Without Consent -------575
Convicted of Misdemeanor ---------120
Operating During Period of Suspension
38
Failure to Appear for Hearing -----225
Failure to File Accident Report ----218
Involved in Fatal Accident --------592
Incompetent to Operate ------------08
Impersonation ---------------------80 8
Permitting Violation ---------------207
Violation of Liquor Laws ----------1156
Habitual Viol. Motor Vehicle Laws ---168
Misuse of Motor Vehicle
Misuse of Registration Plates -------Fail. to File Proof of Finan. Reap....
Fail, to Main. Proof of Finan. Resp. Fail. to Satisfy Judgment............
Common Carrier....................
Miscellaneous ---------------------877

399
26
412
97
86
2
68
11
186
90
28
191
868
80
150
269
160
884
26
100
2

472
18
818
59
45
1
58

812
17
829
89
27
4
48

258
38
1745
85
24
5
29

2985 486
57
41
8061 2117
41
88
24
67
1
5
89
51

160
185
18
552
198
84
182
204
185
425
79
104
.5

148
168
41
855
861
868
146
142
125
862
18
93

198
85
1414
29
19
1
83
1
140
120
84
748
181
875
158
141
184
804
9
15

1
16

2
21

11
57

9
62

1
8
176
114
1
18
118

4562
829
11641
489
429
28
1044
217
1789
1160
441
5472
1820
2176
1551
1795
1729
2672
8
806
68
88
2204
165
55
1040

9670

2987

8825

4179

4154

4709

20247

5964

6264

7028

6597

SUSPENSIONS

TOTAL ----------------------TOTAL REVOCATIONS
& SUSPENSIONS ----

171
158
64
792
24
283
199
204
278
41

180
154
104
1088
16
258
227
227
884

214
170
124
1026
9
278
201
168
256

1

16

22
574
892
61
18
148

11
8
1498
108
8
251

7492

7181

48697

8116 10992 11188

76891

